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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #2A-9/15-16/77 
In the Matter of 
CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS - NASSAU BOCES 
LOCAL 2551, AFL-CIO, _ ' 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
On November 18, 1976, Counsel to this Board filed a charge against 
the Central Council of Teachers - Nassau BOCES - Local 2551, AFL-CIO (Local 
2551) alleging that it violated Section 210.1 of the Taylor Law.by engaging 
in a seven-day strike against the Board of Cooperative Educational Services 
of Nassau County (BOCES) on October 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25 and 26, 1976. 
Local 2551 answered the charge by denying its material allegations and 
by asserting that its responsibility for the strike, if any, was diminished 
by reason of acts of extreme provocation engaged in by the BOCES and its 
agents. 
In lieu of a formal hearing, the parties stipulated that the 
transcript of testimony presented during a non-jury trial held to determine 
whether Local 2551 officers and members violated a temporary restraining 
order should constitute the record in this case. All parties submitted 
briefs. 
The hearing officer determined that Local 2551 did engage in a 
seven-day strike as charged in violation of Section 210.1 of the Taylor Law. 
He also found that during the strike student attendance dropped substantially. 
Thus the strike had negative impact on the welfare of the community, but 
there is no evidence that it had a negative impact upon public health or 
safety. ;' M€)f*& 
: 4obo 
BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
Case No. D-0139 
Board - D-0139 _2 
The hearing officer rejected the proposition that the strike was 
precipitated by acts of extreme provocation on the part of BOCES or its agents. 
He determined that Local 2551 "struck to persuade BOCES to improve its financial 
offer." He also determined that BOCES's refusal to offer any salary increase 
was motivated only by economic considerations. 
Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the rights of Central Council of Teachers -
Nassau BOCES - Local 2551, AFL-CIO to membership dues deduction and to any 
agency shop fee deductions which may be negotiated shall be forfeited for a 
period of six (6) months commencing on the first practicable date and that they 
shall be restored at the end of such period, (six months) only after Central 
Council of Teachers - Nassau BOCES - Local 2551, AFL-CIO affirms that it no 
longer asserts the right to strike against any government; provided, however, 
that if it becomes necessary to utilize the dues deduction process for the 
purpose of paying the whole or any part of a fine imposed by order of a court 
as a penalty in a contempt action arising out of a strike herein, the suspension 
of dues deduction privileges ordered hereby may be interrupted or postponed for 
such period as shall be sufficient to comply with such order of the court, 
whereupon the suspension order hereby shall be resumed or initiated, as the case 
may be, and shall continue for such duration as may be necessary to result in a 
total period of suspension of six months. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 
^oseph/R. Crowley 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-9/15-16/77 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1041, AFSCME and SECURITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES COUNCIL 82, AFSCME 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0130 
As amended, the charge herein, which was filed by Counsel to the Public 
Employment Relations Board, alleges that Local 1041, AFSCME, violated §210.1 of 
the Taylor Law "in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged 
in a strike against the State of New York on August 4, 1975...." The alleged 
strike occurred when "Security personnel assigned to the 7:20 a.m. shift at 
Eastern New York Correctional Facility, including members of Local 1041, AFSCME, 
did not commence performance of their duties until approximately 8:40 a.m." 
After a hearing which lasted three days, the hearing officer determined that 
there had been no strike and he dismissed the charge. Both the charging party 
and New York State, which intervened in the proceeding, have filed briefs in 
opposition to the hearing officer's determination. 
FACTS 
On August 3, 1975 there was considerable unrest among the inmates at 
the Eastern New York Correctional Facility. Many inmates appeared to be armed 
and one was stabbed. When the president of Local 1041 reported to work on 
August 4, 1975 at 7:20 a.m, he found notes in the union box requesting a- frisk 
of the inmates. This request was transmitted to Lieutenant Demskie, the officei 
in charge of the shift, who told the two representatives of the correction 
officers that he was not empowered to authorize a frisk and that he would seek 
clarification from the deputy superintendent of security services and/or the 
superintendent. Meanwhile, Demskie instructed that the men,.should "stay 
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1 
put". 
Thereafter, Demskie reported that a frisk of the inmates had been 
2 
authorized after breakfast. This report was met by silence and inaction on the 
part of the correction officers. At this point, the deputy superintendent of 
security services met with representatives of the correction officers. Shortly 
afterwards, instructions were received from the superintendent for a frisk and 
the correction officers commenced working. Many weapons were seized during the 
frisk. 
The charging party and the State argue that even if the correction 
officers had been instructed to "stay put" while Demskie affirmed whether a 
frisk was authorized, they had engaged in a strike when, thereafter, Demskie 
told them that a frisk would be held after the inmates were taken to breakfast. 
We do not agree that what transpired at this time constituted a strike. Ordi-
narily the failure of employees to perform their regularly scheduled duties is 
a strike. In the instant situation, however, the work assignment was one that 
involved unusual danger and the correction officers were within their rights in 
seeking a clarification of their assignment under the circumstances. They were 
also entitled to have that clarification stated to them in plain and un-
ambiguous terms. Absent an explicit order, their conduct cannot be deemed so 
serious a matter as a strike. The message given to the correction officers by 
_1 There is a conflict in the testimony on this point and the State, in its 
brief, urges us to credit the,testimony of Demskie that he did not instruct 
the correction officers to wait until he had a response concerning the frisk. 
The hearing officer, however, made a contrary credibility resolution. He 
determined that Krom, the president of Local 1041, had a clearer recollection 
of events. Nothing in the record persuades us to upset the hearing officer's 
findings of facts. J B O O A 
_2 Here, too, there is a conflict in the testimony. The witnesses on behalf of 
Local 1041 testified that Demskie did not offer a frisk after breakfast, but 
a "partial" frisk which, according to them, evoked no reaction because the 
correction officers did not know what was meant by a "partial" frisk. Again, 
we accept the vers'itin of the testimony that was accepted by the hearing officer 
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Lieutenant Demskie that a frisk would be held after breakfast was not a suf-
ficiently clear arid explicit order. It could easily have been, and apparently 
was, understood as a proposal in an ongoing discussion of what should be done 
in an unusual and dangerous situation. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE CONFIRM the determination of the hearing officer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 
^ /U<-<u*-^-
Ida Klaus 
87' 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 273, I.A.F.F., 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Charging Party. 
The Uniformed Fire Fighters Association, Inc., Local 273, I.A.A.F. 
(Local 273) and the City of New Rochelle (New Rochelle) have been in 
negotiations for an agreement to succeed an expired one. When Local 273 
presented certain demands to a factfinder, New Rochelle filed the instant 
charge alleging that Local 273 violated §209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law by 
improperly insisting upon the negotiation of non-mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. While the matter was pending before this Board, the"' 
parties continued to negotiate and the impasse was submitted to interest 
arbitration pursuant to §209.4 of the Taylor Law. These negotiations 
and the conciliation procedures of the Taylor Law resolved all the negotiation 
issues between the parties but one. That issue is presented by Local 
273's Demand #16, which would establish a health and safety committee. 
Iherefore, it is only that issue which is before us. Because the issue is 
one that primarily involves a dispute as to scope of negotiations under the 
Taylor Law, it was processed under §204.4 of our Rules which provides for a 
determination by this Board upon the record, without any report or recommenda-
tion from a hearing officer. 
ffziv-y/j-o-xo/ // 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. U-2280 
Board - U-2280 -2 
The disputed contract proposal of Local 273 would provide: 
"16. A general Health and Safety Committee should be created 
consisting of two representatives appointed by the City and 
two representatives appointed by the Union. The Committee's 
jurisdiction shall cover all matters of safety to the members 
of the Fire Department, including but not limited to, the 
total number of employees reporting to a fire and the minimum 
number of employees to be assigned to each piece of firefighting 
apparatus. The foregoing is intended to be illustrative and 
not inclusive. Decisions of the Committee shall be made by 
a majority vote, provided, however, that an equal number of 
representatives appear at such Committee meetings, which shall 
be held at least quarterly or on special call of any two of 
the representatives. In the event of a deadlock between the 
Union and City representatives, the issue in dispute shall be 
submitted to binding arbitration." 
This demand presents a difficult problem, but one with which we have dealt in 
the past. The problem is one of balancing the statutory right of a public 
employee organization to negotiate as to terms and conditions of employment 
of the employees whom it represents, including the protection of their health 
and safety from job-connected injury, against the prerogative of a public 
employer to make a unilateral determination as to how it will deploy its per-
sonnel in order to best serve its constituency. In two recent cases, we 
determined that a public employer need not negotiate over a demand that a 
specified number of policemen or firefighters be assigned to a particular 
vehicle. In the first of these two cases, Matter of White : Plains PBA, 9 PERB 
1(3007 (1976), we said (at page 3010): 
"Government has the general right to fix manning requirements 
unilaterally. Safety as a general subject is a mandatory subject 
of negotiations. To attempt to provide in an agreement all aspects 
of safety would be an exercise in futility in that one could not 
anticipate in specific language all possible eventualities.... 
"We suggest that the parties through the negotiating process 
could create a joint safety policy committee that operates under 
general guidelines that are recited in the contract to consider 
issues of safety that relate to manning standards. This process 
could be made subject to the grievance arbitration procedure. 
A demand to establish such a joint safety policy committee would 
be a mandatory subject of negotiations." 
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This proposition was restated in the second case. Matter of I.A.F.F. of the 
City of Newburgh, 10 PERB 11 3001 (1977), in which we said (at page 3003): 
"As we have found here and in other cases, the general subject 
of safety as a means of protecting employees beyond the normal 
hazards inherent in their work is a mandatory item of negotiation. 
Hence, the presence of a general safety clause in the collective 
bargaining agreement should provide a basis for testing the safety 
guarantee in individual fact situations which may arise during 
the life of the agreement by presentation of disputes in such 
specific situations for resolution through the grievance procedure." 
The demand herein was drawn to the specifications of our opinions in 
the White Plains and Newburgh cases and it is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
New Rochelle advances three arguments in opposition to the negotiability 
1 
of the demand. It argues that the proposed clause is devoid of standards that 
would guide a grievance arbitrator in the event that the union and management 
members of the Health and Safety Committee do not agree. We reject this argu-
ment. The thrust of the White Plains case was to reject specific language and 
precise standards because they might constrict the flexibility of a public 
employer to make decisions regarding deployment of its personnel where no sig-
nificant safety factors were involved. In our judgment, the reference to the 
safety of employees would provide sufficient guidance to the members of the 
Health and Safety Committee and to the arbitrator. The employer might, if it 
wishes, propose some additional general standards, but this goes to the merits 
and not to the negotiability of Local 273's proposal. 
The second argument of New Rochelle is that in our White Plains and 
Newburgh decisions we imposed a balancing test between the legitimate interests 
1 A fourth argument is that the demand is too broad in that it attempts to 
cover all employees of the Fire Department and not just unit employees. 
While the demand can be read in that way, we do not understand that to be 
the design of Local 273. In any event, the demand is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation only to the extent that it applies to unit employees. 
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of public employers and their employees and that this test requires an appli-
cation of the Taylor Law that can only be made by PESB and not by an arbi-
trator. This is directly contrary to our opinion in the two prior cases. We 
reaffirm that opinion. 
The third argument of New Rochelle would have us withdraw the balancing 
test. Thus, no degree of employee safety, no matter how great, could interfere 
with the management prerogative of deploying personnel no matter how slight the 
impact of the management determination on the nature and extent of its service 
to its constituency. This absolutist argument regarding management prerogatives 
is plainly without merit. Balancing tests are appropriate in deciding whether 
or not a matter is a mandatory subject of negotiation (see in re Ridgefield Park 
Board of Education, 3 N.J. PERC, June 21, 1977, summarized at 719 GERR 11; see 
also American Smelting and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 552 [CA;9, 1969]) and 
in cases such as this, they are essential. 
ACCORDINGLY, we determine that Demand #16 of Local 273 is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 
Ida Klaus 
M 0^1 M 4 iQ *& 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-9/15-16/77 
In the Matter of : 
PORT CHESTER-RYE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
Respondent, : BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and- : 
PORT CHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL : CASE NO. U-23 9 0 
2934, AFT, 
Charging Party. 
On November 5, 1976, the Port Chester Teachers Association, Local 2934, 
AFT (charging party), filed an improper practice charge alleging that while the 
parties were negotiating a successor contract to the one that had expired on 
June 30, 1975, the Port Chester-Rye Union Free School District (respondent) had 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by refusing to entertain a grievance or to submit it to arbitration pursuant to 
the grievance arbitration procedure in the expired contract. The respondent's 
answer asserted as an affirmative defense that as there was no contract in 
existence, there was no longer a grievance arbitration procedure. The hearing 
officer found "that the respondent's curtailment of the grievance arbitration 
procedure constituted a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act." Respondent 
filed exceptions to the decision of the hearing officer. 
FACTS 
The parties have waived a formal hearing; the case was submitted on 
the following stipulation of facts: 
1. That the previous agreement between the parties terminated on 
June 30, 1975, and the parties did not enter into a new agreement until August 
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18, 1976. 
2. That on or about June 3, 1976 respondent's Board of Education 
offered an early retirement inducement to all of its employees, including 
members of the bargaining unit represented by the charging party, which offer, 
by its terms, was to terminate on Kov>ember 1, 1976. 
3. On or about June 16, 1976 the charging party filed a grievance 
with respondent concerning the early retirement offer made by respondent, which 
grievance respondent Superintendent of Schools refused to entertain. 
4. On or about June 30, 1976 the charging party presented this same 
grievance to the respondent Board of Education, which, on July 6, 1976, also 
refused to entertain said grievance. 
5. On or about August 2, 1976 the charging party filed a Demand for 
Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association concerning the same 
grievance. 
6. Respondent, on or about August 26, 1976, moved to stay the arbi-
tration proceedings on the basis that no contract was then in effect between 
the parties. 
7. The charging party, on or about October 8, 1976, withdrew its Demanc. 
for Arbitration and, on or about December 8, 1976, the Supreme Court of 
Westchester County denied the motion to stay the proceedings on the basis that 
there were no grounds on which the Court could grant the stay of arbitration 
since the arbitration proceedings had been withdrawn by the charging party. 
8= No grievances had been heard by respondent Board of Education between 
the termination of the contract on June 30, 1975 and the- new contract agreed to 
on August 18, 1976, but grievances were submitted by charging party at Levels 
One and Two of the provisions of the previous contract which terminated on 
June 30, 1975. Respondent denies that hearings took place regarding these 
grievances, but admits that each of the grievances so submitted were signed by 
1876 
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its principal, Superintendent or Acting Superintendent, with comments 
regarding the grievance disposition. 
DISCUSSION 
The hearing officer, in finding a violation, relied upon the decision of 
this Board in Matter of Board of Education of Malone Central School District, 
1 
8 PERB T3078. 
Without considering whether the underlying complaint concerning the 
employer's retirement offer should more appropriately have been presented in the 
form of an improper practice before this Board, rather than as a grievance, the 
employer's position that it would hear no grievances regardless of their sub-
stance cannot be sustained. As we read §208 of the Act, the employer has a 
continuing duty to deal with the union with respect to grievances. In this 
case, the employer violated that duty. The obligation of an employer to accept 
and hear grievances is not terminated upon the expiration of a contract. As 
provided in §208.1(a) of the Act, the public employer is required to extend to 
a recognized or certified employee organization the right to represent employees 
in the settlement of grievances. Thus, the obligation to bargain with respect 
to grievances continues as long as the employee organization remains certified 
or recognized. 
We believe, however, that a distinction should be made as to the obligation 
of the employer itself in such circumstances to entertain and attempt to adjust 
grievances which arise subsequent to the termination of the contract and its 
obligation to permit such unresolved grievances to proceed to arbitration. 
1^  To the extent that the Board's decision in Malone relates to Matter of 
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB 3037, we do not find it 
applicable here. 
0*7 
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The obligation to arbitrate must be regarded as wholly contractual, 
deriving its existence from the terms of the actual bargain of the parties, 
rather than from the statutory mandate (see CPLR §7501 et seq.). Here, the 
contract had expired. As found by the Appellate Division, Second Department 
In the Matter of Board of Education (Poughkeepsie Teachers Association), 44 A.D. 
2d 598 (1974), a contract having expired, the provision to arbitrate is no 
longer in effect. 
We, therefore, find that the failure of the employer to entertain the 
grievance was a violation of the Act, but that the refusal of the employer to 
permit the grievance to proceed to arbitration was not a violation by reason of 
the fact that there was no agreement to arbitrate then in existence between the 
parties. In reaching this determination, we do not overrule the majority opinion 
in the Malone case, supra, because in that case there was a stipulation between 
the parties to the effect that they had "agreed that all items in the then 
current contract which was due to expire on June 30, 1974 would remain the same 
unless either party requested that a particular item be modified or amended" 
and that neither party had sought a modification or amendment of the grievance 
arbitration procedure. There was no such agreement in the instant case. There-
fore, we find the Malone decision to be inapposite. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Port Chester-Rye Union Free School District 
to negotiate in good faith with respect to grievances. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 
Joseph il. Crowley .J 'sephyR  J 
Ida Klaus 
4o*o 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE ORANGE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
THE COUNTY OF ORANGE, 
Charging Party. 
//2E-9/15-16/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2579 
The charge herein was filed on March 1, 1977 by the County of Orange on 
behalf of the Orange County Community College (Jemployer). It alleges that the 
Orange County Community College Association (Association) violated §209-a.2 of 
the Taylor Law by failing to negotiate in good faith in that it insisted upon 
the negotiation of nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. The employer alleges 
that more than twenty of the Association's demands which it has insisted upon 
during factfinding are not mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Association 
responds that all of the demands complained about by the employer are mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. It also argues that the charge is not timely. 
At the request of the parties, and in accordance with §204.4 of our Rules 
we have dispensed with an intermediate report from a hearing officer. After a 
conference with the hearing officer, the parties submitted their briefs directly 
to us. In its brief, the employer withdraws its objection to several of the 
Association's demands. In some instances it does so explicitly: in others it 
does so by making no argument in support of that specification of the charge. 
In its brief, the Association also diminishes the number of the issues presentee 
to us by the pleadings by withdrawing some of its demands. Nevertheless, there 
remain fifteen demands in contention. 
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The parties are in negotiations for a successor to an agreement that 
expired on September 1, 1976. Those negotiations commenced before the expira-
tion of that agreement. From the outset, the employer refused to negotiate 
about certain demands of the Association that it alleged to be nonmandatory 
and on May 28, 1976, the Association charged the employer with failure to nego-
tiate in good faith in that it refused to negotiate with regard to twenty-three 
such demands. On September 24, 1976, we issued a decision in that case (9 PERB 
1f3068) in which we held some of the demands to be mandatory subjects of nego-
tiation and others not. Most of the demands challenged by the employer in this 
case were not before us in the earlier one. In some instances, however, the 
demands now in question are reformulations of demands that were previously 
determined not to be mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
In our prior decision in this dispute, we wrote: 
"Our determination that a particular matter is not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation does not pre-
clude the public employer from negotiating with 
the Association with respect to that item. Similarly, 
our determination that a particular matter is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation does not require 
that the parties reach agreement as to it in their 
negotiations." 
Regrettably, the parties could not resolve the dispute regarding the substance 
of the demands and had to resort to the filing of yet another charge. 
The Association argues that the charge is not timely because it was not 
filed within four months of the presentation of the demands that it complains 
about. The implication of this defense is that the mere raising of a non-
mandatory subject of negotiation would be an improper practice. This is not 
the case. The parties are permitted to make demands in nonmandatory areas and 
they are encouraged to negotiate about such demands. Therefore, the charge was 
timely filed. 
:OOH 
Board - U-2579 -3 
DEMAND #12 
"No student advisees shall be assigned to the President 
of the Faculty Association. The teaching load of said 
president shall be at least three credit hours each 
semester less than the normal load set forth herein. 
In addition, the employer would assign a teaching schedule 
that will maximize the president's availability for per-
forming official duties." 
This is a mandatory subject of negotiation. In the prior decision, we 
determined that a demand that no member of the teaching faculty be required to 
have student advisees was not a mandatory subject of negotiation, saying, 
"Whether or not students should have access to members of the teaching faculty 
for advice on their academic pursuits and course-related matters is an aspect 
of educational policy." This is a demand for a reduced work assignment for 
the president of the Association. In Matter of City of Albany, 7 PERB ^ [3078 
(1974), affirmed 38 NY 2d 778 (1975), we determined that such a demand is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation because "The ability of an employee organiza-
tion to provide effective representation to its constituency is predicated 
upon having employee leaders of that organization available to devote time to 
the work of the organization." 
DEMAND #18 
"Members of the unit shall be paid 1/560 of 
$20,000 for each student in excess of each 
of the following numbers: (schedule deleted)" 
This is a variation of a demand which, in the earlier case was held to be 
a nonmandatory subject of negotiation but, in this form, it is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. The employer argues that it continues to be a demand 
to restrict class size. The Association argues that it is for premium pay for 
increased workload. Although the effect of such premium pay might be to make 
larger classes less attractive to the employer, the demand would not impose any 
>J 
tOOJL 
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legal restrictions upon the employer from establishing the size of its classes 
unilaterally. The Court of Appeals has so ruled in West Irondequoit Teachers 
Association v. Helsby, 35 NY 2d 46 (1974) when it wrote: 
"The decision whether, say, sections of the fourth grade should 
contain 25, 28 or 32 pupils is a policy decision and not nego-
tiable; whereas whether the teachers responsible for the sections 
are to receive varying consideration and benefits depending on 
the ultimate size of each section as so determined is mandatorily 
negotiable as a condition of employment." 
DEMAND #19 
"A. Faculty Members shall be asked what they 
would like to teach. 
B. The rationale for the rejection of a 
faculty member's schedule shall be 
communicated to the faculty in writing." 
C. [not contested by the employer] 
Paragraph A. is a variation of a demand previously held to be a non-
mandatory subject of negotiation and as reformulated it continues to be non-
mandatory. Paragraph B. derives from paragraph A. and has no independent status 
Thus, it, too, is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
The Association concedes that it is the duty of the employer to deter-
mine what courses should be offered and who should be assigned to teach each 
course. It distinguishes the instant demand, however, by pointing out that it 
only requires the employer to listen to faculty suggestions, A proposal that 
the employer consult with the faculty regarding a nonmandatory subject of nego-
tiation matter may be reasonable, but that does not change the character of the 
demand to a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
DEMAND #20 
"A faculty member's teaching schedule shall be 
arranged over a maximum of four (4) days per 
week, Monday through Friday, and shall be scheduled 
within a five (5) hour time period each day." 
This is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because it would preclude 
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the offering of classes on Saturdays and Sundays and thus restrict the schedule 
of the services that may be offered by the employer. As such, it is similar to 
Demand #27, which was found to be a nonmandatory subject of negotiation in the 
prior case. 
DEMAND #22 
"The Association recognizes that nothing contained in 
this Agreement shall be deemed to limit the County, the 
Board of Trustees or the College in any way in the 
exercise of their regular and customary functions of 
management including but not limited to (1) the scheduling 
of classes and other activities; (2) the right to intro-
duce new or improved methods or facilities; (3) the right 
to formulate any reasonable rules and regulations; (4) the 
right of employment of faculty and initial placement on 
the salary schedule; (5) the use and control of College 
property; and all other rights that have traditionally 
belonged to the County, the Board of Trustees or the 
College. No new policies or customs affecting working 
conditions shall be instituted without prior notification, 
discussion, and written consent of the Association." 
(emphasis supplied) 
The final sentence of the demand renders this a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation to the extent that it would restrict the alteration of policies and 
practices that are management prerogatives even though they may have some 
effect upon working conditions. Although an employee organization may demand 
negotiation over the impact of such an alteration upon terms and conditions of 
employment, it may not insist upon a demand that it be given the opportunity of 
vetoing the alteration itself. 
DEMAND #24 
"If the employer changes any counselor duties, the 
Association shall have the right to negotiate salaries 
and any other impact on hours and working conditions. 
If the ratio of one counselor to 250 students is 
exceeded: 
1. there shall be additional remuneration provided, 
2. there shall be additional support services provided, 
3. counselor participation in committee work shall be 
limited to a maximum of one hour per week, 
Board - U-2579 -6 
4. paperwork and the number of reports required shall 
be reduced, 
5. changes in method will be required, i.e. group 
counselling versus individual counseling." 
The Association's brief in support of this demand makes it clear that 
the five enumerated sentences are alternatives and that the employer would be 
free to decide which would be used to relieve the impact of increased student 
load. 
This is a mandatory subject of negotiation. Unlike Demand #22, it deals 
with the impact of a management determination upon terms and conditions of 
employment. Were the demand to require the imposition of number 5, either 
alone or in concert with some of the other four, it would not be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation, but because number 5 is one of several alternatives, 
the choice of which is left to the employer, the demand is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. 
DEMAND #25 
"Each part-time day faculty member teaching 
proportional full-time load shall be paid a 
proportional salary based upon placement on 
step as a full-time faculty member. Such 
persons shall have all the responsibilities 
and duties of full-time faculty unless both 
parties consent to a part-time salary arrange-
ment with no duties outside of teaching." 
This is a mandatory subject of negotiation. The negotiating unit rep-
resented by the Association includes both the full-time and part-time faculty. 
This is a demand concerning the rate of compensation and job duties of part-
time employees. 
DEMAND #31 
"Sponsorship and attendance at student activities 
shall be voluntary. All sponsorship of student 
activities and coaching shall be compensated at 
the continuing education rate. The credit load 
equivalent shall be determined by the Faculty 
Association and the Administration. Full-time 
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members of this unit shall have first oppor-
tunity in sponsorship of student extra-curricular 
and co-curricular activities." 
The first sentence of the demand is not a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. It is a prerogative of the employer to decide whether it requires 
faculty attendance at student activities. The remainder of the demand is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. In the prior decision, we determined that 
the employer must negotiate over a demand that "relates to the opportunity of 
an employee within the negotiating unit to earn extra compensation in other 
teaching and related assignments." 
DEMAND #34 
"A. Candidates for a teaching vacancy within 
any Division shall be screened and interviewed 
by a committee including two (2) members of the 
Faculty Association elected by the Division. 
The Academic Dean shall sit as an ex-officio, 
non-voting member of the committee. The committee 
shall send its recommendations to the Academic Dean 
for his approval and recommendation to the president 
of the College. 
B. Candidates for the position of Academic Dean and 
any other academic administrator shall be screened 
and interviewed by a committee including at least 
five (5) members selected by the Faculty Association. 
This committee shall forward its recommendation to 
the President of the College. Each committee shall 
elect its own chairman." 
This is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. As in the case of 
Demand #19, the Association argues that all that is required is faculty con-
sultation and that the employer is free to ignore the advice that it received 
in such consultations. An employer need not negotiate over a demand that it 
solicit the advice of the Association in a matter of management prerogative. 
DEMAND #38 
In the prior decision we determined that the following demand was not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
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"Textbooks and other teaching materials shall 
be selected by the faculty member involved in 
teaching a specific course." 
The Association revised that demand in its presentation to the factfinder 
to provide 
"that time limits on the promulgation of a 
required textbook be established and that if 
these are not adhered to that a one course or 
three credit hour abatement be provided. The 
rationale for this demand is that if a pro-
fessional is asked to teach from a new text-
book, he needs either advance time for prepa-
ration or additional time during the semester 
to prepare adequately." 
In its present form, the demand is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
as it deals with the impact of a management decision upon terms and conditions 
of employment, rather than with the decision itself. 
DEMAND #50.9 
"If an employee is ineligible for any benefit, 
he shall receive the cash equivalent." 
This demand is designed to provide alternative benefits to employees 
who are ineligible to receive benefits provided by the agreement by reason of 
having retired from other public employment. It is a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. The employer contends that an employee who is ineligible for a benefii 
provided by the agreement by reason of having retired from other public employ-
ment might also be ineligible to receive payment of its cash equivalent because 
of the provision of a statute, such as Retirement and Social Security Law 
§213-a. This is not a reason to declare an otherwise mandatory subject of 
negotiation nonmandatory. On occasion, a term of a collectively negotiated 
agreement may be illegal when applied in a particular situation. In such a 
situation, the provisions of law would take precedence. 
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DEMAND #50.10 
"Upon retirement, members of this unit shall be 
granted identification cards, faculty and staff 
parking stickers, and first opportunity after 
full-time faculty in teaching part-time courses 
in the day and evening." 
This is a mandatory subject of negotiation. It is not a retirement 
benefit, the negotiation of which is barred by §201.4 of the Taylor Law (see 
Matter of Lynbrook PBA, 10 PEKJB 113065). Like Demand #31, it is that, for the 
duration of the contract period, employees who are in the unit when the contract 
is executed be given an opportunity to earn extra compensation in other 
teaching and related assignments..... in the event they retire during that period. 
DEMAND #53 
"The printed schedule of classes shall be 
considered a permanent schedule unless a 
faculty member requests a change, or unless 
a course is cancelled due to lack of en-
rollment ." 
This is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The planning of course 
schedules commences months before the beginning of a school semester. There 
are reasons why the employer may wish to change the schedule of classes other 
than the cancellation of a course due to lack of enrollment. Such reasons 
involve a matter of educational policy. This demand would impose a restriction 
upon the authority of management to make such educational judgments. 
DEMAND #54 
In the earlier case we determined that the following demand was not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
"No member of the teaching faculty will be required 
to have advisees. The ratio of professional coun-
selors to full-time students shall not exceed 1 to 
250." 
The Association revised that demand in its presentation to the fact-
finder to provide that "the faculty association would withdraw this demand in 
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favor of present practice." Neither the record nor the prior contract between 
the parties specifies what the present practice is. If the revised demand is 
that the employer agree to retain the present practice, and if that practice 
imposes any numerical limitations, the demand is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. If it does not impose such limitations, the matter cannot now be 
considered because the demand is too vague to permit any ruling. 
DEMAND #61 
"The President's Committee on Reappointment and 
Tenure shall include tenured members of the unit. 
The President shall define all criteria to be used 
for promotion, retention and tenure and shall give 
a copy to all faculty members by September 1 of 
each academic year. Written rationale for the 
decision shall be given to the faculty member when 
promotion, retention, or tenure is denied." 
This is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. It involves the 
governance of the college. (see Matter of Board of Higher Education of the 
City of New York, 7 PERB 1(3028 [1974]). Like Demands Nos. 19 and 34, it would 
require the employer to consult with faculty before making management decisions 
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the above conclusions of law, with respect 
to those matters herein that we determine to be mandatory subjects of nego-
tiation, we find that the Association did not insist upon negotiations im-
properly because there is a duty to negotiate as to them, and we dismiss the 
charge. With respect to those matters that we determine not to be mandatory 
subjects of negotiation, we find that the Association did insist upon negoti-
ations improperly, and 
WE ORDER the Association not to insist upon those demands as a condition 
of reaching agreement. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 
jysepjsf R. Crowley ~/ 
Ida Klaus ^P©€> 
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CONCURRING OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER IDA KLAUS 
In the decision of this Board of April 7, 1977 in Matter of Monroe 
Woodbury Teachers Association, 10 PERB 1f3.029, I dissented from the Board holding 
that it is a per se violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith for one 
party, over the objections of the other, to carry a demand for a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation into factfinding. It is my view, there expressed, that 
factfinding is an extension of the bargaining process and that the majority had 
used a "mechanistic" test in finding that the mere submission to factfinding 
constituted unlawful insistence and, hence, a refusal to negotiate in good 
faith. The dissent proposed that the test should be one of whether there had 
been a showing of insistence on inclusion of the clause as a condition to any 
agreement. It reasoned that the theory underlying that test was that insistence 
on a nonmandatory clause prevented bargaining on mandatory matters and, hence, 
obstructed the fulfillment of the fundamental purposes of the collective bar-
gaining process, which is to reach agreement as to terms and conditions of 
employment governing the employer-employee relationship. It noted also the 
absence of an evidentiary record in the case and concluded that no such finding 
could, in any event, be made in that case solely on the pleadings. As an 
alternative to dismissal of the charge, it concluded that the record be reopened 
and the case sent to hearing for a full and complete evidentiary record. 
While the record in the instant case presents a fuller background, there 
is no clear proof that there was insistence on the nonmandatory items as a con-
dition of reaching any agreement as to the mandatory matters. 
However, since the majority of the Board has already declared Board 
doctrine on this issue, I am constrained to adopt it, and I concur in this 
decision and order. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 ^ 
^4^L {3UsU4-— 
Ida Itlaus M •£) ,o *\ 
#2F-9/15-16/77 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent, 
- and -
SYLVESTER KING, GUERINO DENUNCIO, EDELBERTO 
CAMACHO and PAUL CASEY, 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. U-2262 
Charging Parties. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Sylvester King, 
Guerino Denuncio, Edelberto Camacho and Paul Casey (charging parties) from 
a hearing officer's decision which dismissed their charge on the ground 
that it was not filed within the time limits authorized by Section 204.1(a)(1) 
of our Rules of Procedure. That Rule authorizes the filing of a charge 
within four months of the act complained about. The charge was mailed 
to the New York State Public Employment Relations Board(PERB) on August 28,197( 
and it complains of an act of the New York City Transit Authority (TA) 
that occurred on January 4, 1976. 
On that day, the charging parties, all surface line dispatchers who 
had been employed in Queens where they had been represented by the Queens 
Supervisory Association, were transferred to different locations where 
their job title was represented by the Subway Surface Supervisory 
Association. Allegedly, the effect of the transfer was that they lost all 
seniority in title and were placed at the bottom of the lists for picks of 
schedules. 
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The Queens Supervisory Association had brought a grievance on 
behalf of the charging parties, but that grievance was dismissed on April 
23, 1976 on the ground that the charging parties were then in a negotiating 
unit represented by the Subway Surface Supervisory Association and that the 
Queens Supervisory Association no longer had any standing to represent them. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge as untimely. In doing 
so, he rejected two contentions of the charging parties: (1) that the loss 
of seniority was a continuing violation, and (2) that the time during which to 
file a charge with PERB did not begin to run until April 23, 1976 which is when 
charging parties had exhausted their contractual remedies. The charging parties' 
exceptions are directed to the hearing officer's conclusion that the time 
during which to file the charge ran from January 4, 1976 and not from April 
23, 1976. Charging parties argue that the grievance procedure is like an 
administrative remedy which had to be exhausted before the charge could have 
been filed. This analogy to administrative law and the principle of the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not appropriate. The grievance 
procedure is not an administrative law proceeding'; it i-s. a,'contractual' 
procedure designed to protect the private rights of employees and parties 
to the contract. By way of contrast, the improper practice procedures 
set forth in §209-a of the Taylor Law are designed to protect the 
statutory rights of employees, employee organizations and public employers. 
That such rights do not always coincide is made clear in a recent amendment 
of §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law which provides that this Board does not have 
authority "to enforce an agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation 
of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice" (L.i.9.7'7>' e<>4?29) Because of this 
distinction, it is not unusual for an aggrieved individual, to file an 
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improper practice charge and a grievance simultaneously. This is recognized 
by charging parties who argued before the hearing officer that their time 
to file a charge should have., been tolled during the pendency of the. grievance 
because this Board might have deferred consideration of the charge at that 
time. 
We agree with the hearing officer that from January 4, 1976 on the 
charging parties were free to file their charge with PERB and preserve their 
rights, if any, and that in riot doing so'; ithey acted at their peril. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
September 15, 1977 
J/SEPH/R.'CROWLEY 
XJ^C^-O- ' 
IDA KLAUS 
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fCn t h e M a t t e r o f 
:0UNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
- a n d -
lORRECTION OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF 
(ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
STATE OF KEW YOKK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION.. ;.ARD 
E m p l o y e r , 
#2G-9/15-16/77 
CASE NO.' C - 1 5 1 7 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in" the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Eraployraent Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the-, authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Correction Officers 
Association of Rockland County 
has' been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the .above-named public employer, -in the unit described' below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of colieccj..'."e' 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.-
Unit: INCLUDED: Jailer and Senior Jailer 
EXCLUDED: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
ishall negotiate collectively with the Correction Officers 
Association of Rockland County 
and enter -into a written agreement v/.ith such employee organization 
•.'ith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall .1 
legotiate collectively with' sucn employee- organization in -the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 15 day of September 19 77 
Ida Klaus 
4©i« 
